Khurram Khan
Pakistan is facing twin threats of insurgency – one motivated by secession and the other by replacing the existing constitutional order with its own interpretation of Shariah. Secessionist Baloch militancy is outwardly ethnic in its character. Their prime targets are personnel of security and law enforcement agencies in a classical ploy of insurgents. However, unlike the Khawarij (used for TTP), the Baloch terrorists also target members of other ethnic groups from outside the province.
The other common target of both these outfits are the Chinese nationals. Presence of Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) elements in the folds of TTP could be the main motivator of targeting Chinese nationals in the GB and adjoining areas. China is using its economic and political tools to woo the otherwise isolated Interim Government of Afghanistan ruled by TTA. In the bargain the Chinese would impress upon the TTA to reign in the ETIM/TTP elements from attacking its interests in Pakistan and indeed in the autonomous Uighur region of Xinjiang.
Regional and global powers that despise Chinese presence in the Arabian Sea exploit the Baloch grievance against Pakistan to scuttle development projects in the coastal areas of Pakistan by targeting Chinese interests and establishments.
Militants of both these groups are striking their targets on a daily basis resulting in loss of lives of security and law enforcement personnel. The valour and courage of our security and law enforcement has never been in doubt but martyrdom of our brave soldiers and policemen could not go like this.
Operation Azm-e-Istehkam launched by the government is aimed at crushing the militancy. The crush COIN strategy was successful in dealing with the Baloch insurgency in the mid-1970s when one or two tribes had taken up arms against the state. Now other tribes like Bugti have also joined the fray in addition the youth in tribal less society of Makran are ideologically aligned with the militants.
Intelligence Based Operations (IBOs) against the terrorists have yielded success in recent weeks but it has not eliminated the risk. The National Action Plan (NAP) adopted in 2014 resolved that the Balochistan government was empowered for political reconciliation with complete ownership by all stakeholders. Some headway was made till 2018 when the ouster of the then Balochistan Chief Minister Sanaullah Zehri was orchestrated. Thereafter, no worthwhile initiative was taken. The revised NAP in 2021 reiterated the Balochistan Reconciliation Process but withdrew the lead role of the Balochistan government in the process. The revised NAP also resolved reforms in the merged districts (erstwhile FATA) of KP in the domain of National Finance Commission, capacity building of LEAs. Local government and land reforms. However, the pledges made at the time of merger of FATA with KPK and subsequently in NAP have not materialised.
The government it seems has limited its COIN strategy options by concentrating on kinetic action against the militants. In the absence of any parallel initiatives to address the grievances of the disgruntled elements would further antagonise the populace in the two provinces. Brushing the rights movements in the shape of Pashtoon Tahaffuz Movement (PTM) in the merged districts of KPK and Baloch Yekjethi Committee as anti-state and agents of foreign inimical states would further create schism and hatred against the state.
Alongside the Kinetic option the COIN strategy of development, pacification, legitimacy of government, legitimacy of use of force and reform must go in tandem. Population centric approach or winning hearts and minds is time consuming but rewarding in the long run.
Opening dialogue on relations between the federation and the provinces; reassessment of constitutional provisions of unfettered movement and settlement; and redefining the ownership of natural resources would indicate an intention of the state to find a way out to address the concerns of the Baloch people.
The diametrically opposing stance of the state and the TTP has stalled any negotiations. The state has rejected nonnegotiable demands of restoring FATA status; and withdrawal of the Pakistan Army from the merged districts. The state has called upon the Khawarij to lay down arms and accept suzerainty of the Constitution as a precondition to any talks. There has to be an initiative to find a middle ground. Halting attacks against the forces and IBOs against the militants could be a starting point.
Preeminence of the Constitution must be maintained. However, changes effected in the constitution on whims and for narrow political objectives, and flagrant violation of constitutional provisions by the state do not inculcate confidence in the notion of supremacy and inviolability of the constitution. What is preached must also be practiced to have any impact.
The author is a former Joint Director General Intelligence Bureau.