Dr. Naveed Elahi

The attack on Chinese nationals in Karachi by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) was a meticulously planned act of terrorism, reflecting a significant investment of both intelligence and financial resources. The BLA’s access to confidential information, such as the schedule of Chinese engineers, movement time and route, strongly suggests insider assistance. This allowed them to perform thorough reconnaissance, select a precise attack point within a high-security zone, and even conduct rehearsals—all requiring substantial funding. According to officials and BLA’s own claim, the BLA’s intelligence wing, ‘ZIRAB’ (Zephyr Intelligence Research & Analysis Bureau), orchestrated the attack.

The involvement of external actors is also a crucial aspect. Government sources attribute the BLA’s rising capabilities to funding and support from foreign intelligence agencies, particularly India’s intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). Investigators from Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) estimate that RAW provided over Rs100 million in financial backing, which enabled the BLA to carry out this operation, including Rs70 million for the vehicle used in the bombing. This financial inflow has also allowed the BLA to recruit tech-savvy, educated individuals like Shah Fahad, who was involved in the attack. This trend of educated youth joining militant ranks is deeply concerning for Pakistan’s internal security and its foreign relations, particularly with China.

Karachi, being Pakistan’s economic hub, has often been the target of BLA and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) attacks. The city’s diverse population, including a large number of Baloch and Pashtun residents, provides cover for militants to blend in and operate with relative impunity. The BLA has carried out five major attacks in Karachi, using the city’s significance as a lever to disrupt Pakistan-China relations and damage projects like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). In response to this incident, the Chinese embassy has issued warnings for its nationals to avoid traveling to high-risk areas such as Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

The BLA’s evolving tactics reflect its growing operational capacity. Their methods now include abduction and murder on ethnic grounds, highway blockades, suicide bombings, and the sabotage of critical infrastructure, with some operations even involving female suicide bombers. This strategy indicates that the BLA is moving beyond traditional insurgent tactics and is focusing on more sophisticated, highly coordinated attacks, capitalizing on the ongoing political instability and the historical grievances in Balochistan, such as the death of Nawab Akbar Bugti and the unresolved issue of missing persons. These narratives help the BLA recruit not only disaffected youth but also women, further complicating the security situation.

There are credible reports, supported by findings from the Counter Terrorism Department (CTD), suggesting that the explosives used in the attack were supplied by a terrorist organization, potentially the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). It is also suspected that the TTP may have provided crucial intelligence, as well as the vehicle equipped with the improvised explosive device (IED) used in the bombing. Over the years, there have been increasing reports of a collaborative nexus between the TTP and BLA, indicating that these two groups may be sharing resources, intelligence, and operational support to strengthen their respective campaigns.

Some other reports suggest that both groups have safe havens in Afghanistan, where they are also receiving training. It has been observed that the sophisticated weapons and arms used by these groups are mostly U.S. leftovers, which indicates their shared training and tactics. This development has increased the stakes for Pakistan’s security forces, as the scale and sophistication of these operations have become more frequent and lethal across the country.

The insurgency in Balochistan has simmered for years, particularly over the past seventeen years since the death of Nawab Akbar Bugti. However, there is a noticeable lack of a well-formulated counter-insurgency strategy to control the situation effectively. The recent surge in terrorist attacks highlights deficiencies in intelligence operations. Federal intelligence agencies, by now, should have developed deeper infiltration within terrorist groups, as well as among their sympathizers and financiers, to gather crucial foreknowledge that could help preempt and prevent such attacks.

Unfortunately, incidents like the Turbat check-post attack and the recent Karachi attack targeting Chinese nationals demonstrate that terrorists continue to exploit the element of surprise. The absence of timely intelligence and failure to intercept these threats before they materialize reflect a significant gap in the country’s counter-terrorism efforts. The need for improved intelligence gathering and strategic foresight is critical to neutralizing these insurgent operations and ensuring national security.

There are gaping and glaring security and intelligence lapses which were effectively exploited by the BLA terrorists. It is a matter to be investigated how explosives-laden Toyota Hilux entered in the high security zone, parked unnoticed near the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) guard room, a place from where it could ram into the target vehicle?  Why the movement of BLA commander Bashir Ahmed alias Bashir Zeb and Abdul Rehman alias Rehman Gul, who have been mentioned in the FIR, was not monitored?

Pakistan needs to improve its counterintelligence and analytical capabilities to detect and disrupt militant operations before they occur, especially in high-security areas. Proactive intelligence gathering is crucial to preventing future attacks, especially in Karachi.

Besides tackling BLA and other militant groups with an iron hand, the government must prioritize political dialogue with marginalized Baloch communities, addressing their long-standing grievances, especially the issue of missing persons. Without this, any counter-insurgency efforts will remain incomplete. Only through addressing the root causes of the insurgency can long-term peace and stability be achieved in Balochistan, ensuring that attacks on foreign nationals and vital projects like CPEC are effectively prevented.

Engaging neighboring countries like Afghanistan and Iran is essential to reduce external support for militant groups operating in Balochistan. Pakistan must work diplomatically to ensure that its neighbors do not provide safe havens or financial assistance to these groups. Cooperation and support from China are crucial to enhance the capabilities of intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies (LEAs) to counter terrorism and insurgency.

Given the growing sophistication of attacks, protecting critical national infrastructure should be a top priority. This includes better coordination between security agencies and public-private partnerships to secure key sectors such as energy, transportation, and communication.

It goes without saying that Pakistan has no option but to fight this multi-pronged war with a multi-faceted counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategy with full zeal and vigor.

The author is Chief Editor of The Strategic Brief