Dr.Naveed Elahi & Saima Khan

When Parag Jain took charge as the 25th Secretary of India’s Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) on July 1, 2025, his appointment marked more than just a bureaucratic rotation. It signaled a deliberate recalibration of India’s external intelligence posture: more operationally belligerent, more tactical than strategic, and less restrained by diplomatic niceties and norms. For New Delhi, Pakistan remains the principal theater of concern, and Jain’s reputation as a Pakistan hater, aligned with BJP ideology, makes him the government’s instrument of choice in a period defined by heightened security risks and complex geopolitics. The critical question, however, remains: is this choice and strategy suitable for an external intelligence agency?

Background and Early Career

Despite serving in R&AW for two decades, Jain, an IPS officer of the 1989 Punjab cadre, is more rooted in internal security operations. He cut his teeth in counterinsurgency during the Sikh uprising years in Punjab. His early experience in volatile districts such as Bhatinda and Mansa equipped him with tradecraft in source handling, infiltration, and interdiction. That grounding was later reinforced during stints in Jammu and Kashmir, where he oversaw repressive security operations around the abrogation of Article 370 and the Balakot strikes.

Pakistan Desk Experience at RAW

Over twenty years in RAW—much of it on the Pakistan desk—made Jain one of the agency’s most seasoned Pakistan watchers. His subsequent leadership of the Aviation Research Centre (ARC), RAW’s aerial surveillance and technical intelligence wing, demonstrated his capacity to integrate HUMINT with high-end ISR capabilities. Under his watch, ARC provided faster “sensor-to-shooter” loops, directly enabling precision targeting. Foreign postings in Canada and Sri Lanka broadened his operational horizons, though the former was marred by allegations of interference in Sikh diaspora politics, a controversy that continues to shadow him.

Lies & Deception- A dangerous trait

It is said that as the head of the Aviation Research Centre (ARC), he was instrumental in providing critical real-time aerial surveillance and intelligence inputs that enabled precision missile strikes on alleged terror infrastructure in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir. Officials emphasized that the success of these pinpoint targeting efforts was the culmination of “years of groundwork and painstaking network-building” under Jain’s leadership. This is highly exaggerated, preposterous and ridiculous credit attributed to him. Even general public of Pakistan knows that there were no such things at these places. It is a dangerous trait of Jain’s character to exploit the weakness of Modi and Doval to target Pakistan. It shows he can resort to lies and deception for his own motives.

Political Context and Strategic Intent

Jain’s elevation cannot be separated from the Modi–Doval security doctrine. Since 2016, India’s “new normal” has emphasized hard power signaling, intelligence-led coercive options, and the fusing of all instruments of national power under the Prime Minister’s Office and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval. Jain’s appointment aligns seamlessly with this doctrine.

The political intent behind choosing him is unmistakable:

1. Treat Pakistan as the primary adversary.
2. Reinforce pre-emptive and punitive doctrines against cross-border militancy and the Kashmiri insurgency.
3. Escalate the campaign against Khalistani separatists, both inside India and in Western diasporas.
4. Prioritize security outcomes even at the expense of diplomatic discomfort.

The timing of his appointment is crucial. He assumes command after the bruising “Operation Sindoor” war with Pakistan, in which Indian forces suffered setbacks. This only underscores New Delhi’s desire for a harder edge in intelligence operations.

The Doval–Jain Nexus

Jain’s appointment reflects alignment with NSA Ajit Doval’s strategic worldview. If Doval is the visible strategist and political signaler, Jain is the quiet executor. Doval, however, has often been criticized for lacking subtlety in external intelligence, operating largely at the tactical level, and publicly boasting of operations—traits not admired in intelligence tradecraft. He has openly stated that RAW was responsible for the dismemberment of East Pakistan and was active in creating unrest in Balochistan.

Jain, as a career police officer trained to use tactics within his jurisdiction, has been selected to extend this approach internationally. Together, the duo is expected to pursue strategies of covert and surreptitious target killings of adversaries.

RAW has often faced setbacks while pursuing the Doval Doctrine of “ghar mein ghus kar marenge.” It has been caught red-handed in Canada, the U.S., Pakistan, and elsewhere. One case was the crude and reckless assassination net run by Pavan Kumar Rai, a RAW officer posted undercover as a diplomat at the Indian High Commission in Ottawa. Rai coordinated the killing of Canadian Sikh separatist Hardeep Singh Nijjar outside a Gurdwara in Surrey, B.C., on June 18, 2023. Rai failed to realize he was not operating in New Delhi but in Toronto, where CCTV surveillance captured all movements. Canadian intelligence and the Five Eyes alliance obtained irrefutable evidence of Rai’s meetings with the assassins.

In September 2023, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced that Canada’s intelligence agencies were pursuing “credible allegations” linking Indian government agents to Nijjar’s assassination. This sparked a diplomatic crisis and the expulsion of Indian diplomats. Foreign Affairs Minister Mélanie Joly confirmed the expulsion of Pavan Kumar Rai, identifying him as the head of R&AW operations in Canada.

By May 2024, the RCMP had arrested three Indian nationals—Karan Brar, Kamal Preet Singh, and Karan Preet Singh—in Edmonton, Alberta. A fourth, Amandeep Singh, was arrested in British Columbia. All were charged with first-degree murder and conspiracy.

Notably, from 2015 to 2018, Parag Jain himself had served in Canada, tasked with monitoring the Sikh diaspora and Khalistan-linked elements. His activities were detected by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), with reports accusing him of influencing domestic politics via visa blacklists, facilitating visas for politicians of Indian origin, and infiltrating Sikh Gurdwaras to incite internal disputes over “cultural wars.”

In Punjab, Jain had registered multiple cases against Sikh separatists abroad—many seen as baseless—creating legal cover to justify their targeting or killings both inside and outside India.

Pakistan-Facing Posture

Jain’s tenure will be most defined by his approach toward Pakistan. His strategic intent can be distilled into the following lines of effort:

Target-system disarticulation: Persistent ISR and HUMINT to degrade leadership, finance, and training pipelines in Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir.

Target killings inside Pakistan: At least twenty people—mostly Kashmiris and one Sikh—have been killed by R&AW inside Pakistan in the past two years. Influenced by Mossad, Indian intelligence has adopted this approach, which may intensify under Jain.

Narrative and lawfare: Sustained propaganda campaigns to depict Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism, including the use of social media and AI to generate fabricated images, videos, and documentaries.

CPEC and China: With Pakistan–China relations seen as a major obstacle for India, Jain is expected to attempt to drive a wedge in the partnership. Undermining CPEC projects, particularly Gwadar Port, will be a priority.

Escalation management: Conducting bounded operations that signal resolve while trying to avoid uncontrolled escalation.

The Khalistan Question Abroad

Perhaps the most diplomatically sensitive aspect of Jain’s profile is his record in Canada. Monitoring Sikh diaspora networks linked to Khalistan was, for India, a matter of national security—but for Ottawa, it constituted foreign interference. The fallout was exposure, controversy, and a cloud over bilateral relations.

Now as RAW chief, Jain is expected to intensify operations against Sikh separatist ecosystems abroad. The friction line is stark: India frames it as counter-terrorism; host democracies view it as a civil-liberties issue. Covert diaspora operations risk expulsions, prosecutions, and reputational costs. His very appointment has already triggered anger among Sikh groups both inside India and abroad.

Strengths and Flanks

Jain’s strengths are clear: operational discipline, institutional memory, and credibility with both case officers and political leadership. Yet his vulnerabilities are also apparent:

• Diplomatic baggage from controversies in Canada and the US.
• Pakistan’s heightened alertness and readiness to respond to Indian operations.
• Risk of tit-for-tat escalation, as seen during the 1990s wave of reciprocal bombings in Indian and Pakistani cities.
• Jain favours tactical measures such as target killings, appreciated by both Doval and Modi for their optical impact. However, this reliance on tactics may hinder the development of long-term strategic approaches such as dialogue or confidence-building measures.

The constraints are obvious: sustaining HUMINT in hardened CI environments, managing escalation risks, and coping with international scrutiny. Jain is expected to demand larger budgets to “create more trouble,” worsening already strained relations.

Additionally, he can’t remain unmindful of the fact that Pakistan is a nuclear state capable of delivering a strong response to Indian bellicosity. The last conflict underscored how quickly clashes can spiral out of control. Escalation control will depend on fragile deniability and crisis hotlines.

International Reactions

Western governments and intelligence agencies remain wary of Modi–Jain–Doval style interference on their soil. Political systems in Canada, the UK, and the U.S. are already primed to respond harshly to any exposure of diaspora-targeted operations. Pakistan will portray Jain’s tenure as escalatory, while China will counter in the cyber and information domains. In intelligence, capability earns quiet respect—but exposure invites public censure. Despite his tenure in RAW, Jain still exhibits the police officer’s tendency to act brashly, raising the likelihood of being caught, as happened in Canada.

RAW’s Internal Dissensions

Parag Jain steps into the leadership of RAW at a time when the agency is grappling with deep institutional challenges. The Pahalgam attack in April 2025—which claimed 26 civilian lives—laid bare a staggering intelligence failure. As highlighted by former Army Chief General Shankar Roychowdhury, this was “an intelligence failure,” and investigative analyses pinpointed weak ground-level HUMINT and siloed coordination among the intelligence community as root causes.

Adding to these strategic lapses, critics have long noted RAW’s structural imbalance. Former Additional Secretary B. Raman, a veteran analyst, described the agency as “strong in technical intelligence, weak in human intelligence,” and “strong in investigation, weak in prevention”. Institutional rivalries and bureaucratic dysfunction—accentuated by favoritism in promotions and corruption—have further undermined operational cohesion.

On the diplomatic front, allegations surfaced of Indian involvement in an aborted plot to unseat the Maldivian president. Though both governments declined to confirm the coup narrative, the Washington Post report—and subsequent reticence—exposed R&AW to international scrutiny and raised internal morale issues .

In this context, Jain inherits an agency bruised not only by tactical failure but also by reputational erosion and internal fragmentation. His mandate necessarily includes restoring morale, modernizing tradecraft, and rebalancing the HUMINT/TECHINT mix. The hardcore intelligence officers in RAW seem to have little faith in him as a leader who is uniquely capable of navigating the entrenched factional rivalries and bureaucratic inertia that have long hampered the organization.

Conclusion

Parag Jain embodies the Modi government’s hardened vision for India’s external intelligence: vindictive, brash, and punching above its weight. His appointment reflects confidence in his adherence to the Modi–Doval “ghar mein ghus kar marenge” doctrine.

Yet the trade-off is evident. Tactical disruption and deterrent signaling may deliver quick results, but diplomatic costs and reputational risks will mount with every exposed operation. For India, Jain’s real test will be whether operational effectiveness can be reconciled with diplomatic legitimacy. His determination to shape the battlespace itself may well backfire, as Pakistan is prepared to give him a tough and sustained response.