Dr. Naveed Elahi

Intelligence is a strange business. Foes, occasionally allies also, resort to espionage against states to safeguard their perceived interests. As the British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston said: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual”, this fact underscores the crucial role of intelligence and counterespionage as fundamental components of statecraft.

However, the emerging dilemma is that the focus of the intelligence agencies has clearly shifted away from the actual work of protecting secrets and spy-catching, or what is known as counterintelligence (CI). In Pakistan senior intelligence officers lament that the required focus on catching spies ‘to prevent them from obtaining intelligence about our situation’, has considerably diminished. The only known case of spy-catching in Pakistan during the last decade is that of Kulbhushan Jadhav, an Indian naval officer serving for its intelligence agency, Research & Analysis Wing (RAW). His capture was a significant blow to RAW’s covert activities aimed at creating unrest in Pakistan, especially in Balochistan. Beyond that, no other known cases have been brought to the public’s attention.

The primary reason for the decline in counterintelligence in Pakistan is that after 9/11, the focus of national intelligence agencies, particularly the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which is primarily a counter-intelligence agency, predominantly shifted towards security and counterterrorism. The US War on Terror generated a drastic strategic shift as terrorism was declared the greatest threat to the world, and most funding was directed towards it.

Secondly, countering terrorists is a more straightforward task, though more perilous, as the targets are clear, and the efforts are more rewarding. At times the list of wanted terrorists is available and the intelligence operatives track them down. Additionally, more funds, rewards and recognitions became rampant in the realm of counterterrorism. The trend of head money became an additional attraction and a tool of recognition. Therefore, there was a drastic shift of focus and efforts from counterintelligence to counterterrorism.

  In contrast, counterintelligence, though crucial, but more cumbersome and painstakingly clandestine, lacks glamour and immediate gratification. This led to a gradual decline in the traditional art of counterintelligence. Axiomatically, this apathy towards CI resulted in tangible decrease in expertise and capability of spy-catching in the intelligence agencies. The new crop of intelligence officers, especially those recruited after 2000, reaching at the helm of affairs in 2020s, lack adequate training, skills and and penchant for counterintelligence. Thus, further widening the gap in this critical field.

The litmus test to measure the performance in this field was to see how often the serious efforts of undercover officers, based in diplomatic missions and embassies or elsewhere, collecting vital information or trying to steal our national secrets, were frustrated. How many under-cover officers and suspect intelligence collectors have been expelled (declared persona non grata) during the last ten years?  The score in this regard is not healthy. It indicates that our counterintelligence capabilities have been rusted, and the goals are skewed. In such a situation, the foreign intelligence moles must be having a field day, causing substantial threat to our interests, at home and abroad.

In the volatile conditions, as prevalent in Pakistan, hostile intelligence agencies employ espionage and subversion in a sophisticated and clandestine manner through agents, spies and fifth columnists. A “fifth column” refers to a clandestine group or faction of subversive agents who attempt to undermine a nation’s solidarity by any means at their disposal. The term is commonly attributed to Emilio Mola Vidal, a Nationalist general during the Spanish Civil War (1936–39). As four of his army columns advanced on Madrid, he referred to his militant supporters within the capital as his “fifth column,” who aimed to weaken the loyalist government from within.

Fifth columnists infiltrate into all levels of the nation, particularly into positions of policy decision and national defense, from there they exploit the fears of the populace by spreading rumors and misinformation, as well as employing traditional espionage and subversion techniques. Though we may be having oodles of such elements in our system, how many fifth columnists, like spies, had we hunted down and neutralized during the last three decades. Again, the performance of counterintelligence has been below par in this regard. A former head of CI Wing IB  informed that a couple of bureaucrats were identified for suspicious activities but no action was taken against them.    

A greater threat is from cut-outs or co-optees. A cut-out or co-optee, as defined by FBI, is mutually trusted person or mechanism used to create a compartment between members of an operation to enable them to pass material and/or messages securely. They can operate under a variety of covers, posing as diplomats, journalists, academics, or businesspeople both at home and abroad. These individuals are tasked with spotting, assessing, targeting, collecting, and running sources. How many co-optees have been identified and brought to book in a decade or so. It appears, none.

                  This perplexing professional decadence in these challenging times has necessitated resetting priorities within intelligence agencies of Pakistan and reallocating resources to give due importance to counterintelligence efforts. This realignment should not only involve increased funding but also a concerted effort to recruit, train, and retain individuals with the necessary skills and aptitude for counterintelligence work. Old timer counterintelligence officers, especially from the Intelligence Bureau, whom I interviewed, clearly remember that three four decades ago even the drivers of intelligence agencies were adept in the art of surveillance to chase and counter the suspected spies and undercover agents. Sadly, these traditions, tactic and traits have visibly diminished.  

With advancements in surveillance, cybersecurity, and data analysis, intelligence agencies have enormous challenges as well as unprecedented opportunities to enhance their ability to identify and mitigate threats from hostile actors. Nevertheless, the foundational practices of human intelligence (HUMINT) must continue to be a primary focus alongside technological advancements to face evolving threats in the digital age. Intelligence agencies must equip CI officers with the necessary tools and tradecraft to operate effectively with the support of technological surveillance and providing analysts with sophisticated AI models to process vast amounts of data, both public and covert, thereby enhancing their analytical capabilities.

The policymakers should be reminded and briefed that the decline in the art of counterintelligence poses a significant risk to national security. George Washington had said, “There is one evil I dread and that is their spies. I think it a matter of some importance to prevent them from obtaining intelligence about our situation.” It is high time to reset priorities, invest in training and technology, and foster a culture that values counterintelligence.

The author is Chief Editor of The Strategic Brief.