Kashif Bangash

As part of efforts to revive and facilitate China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) activities in Pakistan and strengthen coordination with Chinese personnel, the KP Police has introduced Chinese language training for selected security personnel assigned to protect Chinese nationals and strategic development projects.

The first batch of 20 Special Security Unit (SSU) personnel successfully completed the language training and were subsequently deployed to provide security at Chinese led and other foreign development projects across KP. These personnel have been associated with the security of key projects and strategic facilities, including the Suki Kinari Hydropower Project, Peshawar Airport, Rashakai Economic Zone, Tarbela Dam, projects in Haripur and Mansehra, Dasu Dam, Bhasha Dam and other strategic installations.

The initiative seeks to address a longstanding operational challenge arising from language and communication barriers between Chinese engineers, project staff and Pakistani security personnel. Security personnel with basic Chinese language capabilities can facilitate more effective security briefings, movement coordination, emergency communication and incident response, particularly during HIGH RISK situations where timely and accurate information exchange is critical.

Beyond its immediate operational benefits, the initiative could enhance trust and coordination between Chinese project personnel and local security agencies, improve the delivery of security services, and contribute to a more secure environment for the continuation and expansion of CPEC-related and other Chinese-funded development activities in KP.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) – A flagship component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), represents one of the most strategically significant economic and infrastructure partnerships between Pakistan and China. Conceived as a major connectivity corridor linking western China with Pakistan’s Arabian Sea coast, CPEC aims to improve regional connectivity, energy security, trade and investment while contributing to Pakistan’s long-term economic development.

CPEC has considerable strategic importance for both countries. For China, the corridor provides an alternative route towards the Arabian Sea and strengthens its connectivity with South Asia and the wider region. For Pakistan, CPEC offers opportunities for infrastructure development, energy generation, employment, industrialization and foreign investment.

However, the security environment in KP and Baluchistan has emerged as one of the most serious challenges to the long term success of CPEC. The two Provinces contain several strategically important CPEC projects, transportation routes and economic zones, while also facing persistent militant and insurgent threats.

Existing Security Challenges – Pakistan and China have traditionally maintained close relations, frequently describing their Partnership as an Ironclad friendship. However, repeated attacks against Chinese nationals, engineers, workers and CPEC-related facilities have placed increasing pressure on this relationship.

The security challenge is Particularly acute in KP and Balochistan, where militant organizations have demonstrated the capability and intent to target Chinese Personnel and strategically important infrastructure.

In KP, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and associated militant networks represent a major threat, particularly along routes connecting project sites with urban centres and the Afghan border. In Baluchistan, Baloch insurgent organizations, particularly the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), have increasingly targeted Chinese nationals and CPEC related interests. Their stated grievances include opposition to Chinese investment and their perception that local communities do not receive adequate benefits from resource and infrastructure projects.

The security environment is further complicated by the difficult terrain of KP’s mountainous and former tribal areas, as well as the extensive and relatively remote operating environment of Baluchistan. Protecting long road networks, isolated project sites, construction camps and moving convoys requires substantial manpower, intelligence and technological resources.

Major Attacks on Chinese Personnel and CPEC Projects – The Threat became particularly evident following the July 2021 Dasu attack, when a bus carrying workers associated with the Dasu Hydropower Project was targeted, killing 13 people, including nine Chinese nationals.

The security situation again deteriorated significantly on 26 March 2024, when a suicide vehicle-borne attack in Bisham, Shangla District, KP, targeted a convoy carrying Chinese engineers working on the Dasu Hydropower Project. Six people were killed including five Chinese nationals and a Pakistani driver.

The attack had a significant impact on CPEC related activities. Chinese contractors temporarily suspended or slowed work on major hydropower projects in KP while additional security arrangements were demanded and implemented.

These incidents demonstrated that even projects operating in areas considered relatively secure could remain vulnerable to sophisticated attacks during the movement of Chinese personnel.

Strengthening of Security Arrangements in KP

In response to the growing threat, particularly since the early 2020s and following the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021, the KP government and security agencies significantly strengthened security arrangements for Chinese nationals and foreign project personnel.

A comprehensive security framework was developed to provide protection to Chinese engineers, CPEC project staff, and foreign workers and associated national personnel. Security measures included dedicated security formations, route protection, intelligence-based operations, enhanced surveillance, escort arrangements and coordination among Police, intelligence and other security agencies.

KP Police officials have also provided detailed briefings on counterterrorism operations, actions against highly wanted militants, and measures undertaken against organized criminal activities, including drug trafficking and land grabbing, which can indirectly contribute to the broader security threat surrounding major infrastructure projects.

Threats to CPEC – CPEC related personnel, infrastructure and operations continue to face a range of security threats, with militant and insurgent attacks remaining the primary concern. The TTP and affiliated militant networks pose a significant threat to Chinese personnel and projects in KP, while Baloch insurgent groups, particularly the BLA, remain a major threat to Chinese interests in Baluchistan.

Long and Predictable transportation routes between airports, residences, construction sites and project locations increase exposure to surveillance, ambushes, IEDs and vehicle-borne attacks.

The difficult and geographically challenging terrain of KP and the vast, sparsely populated areas of Baluchistan further complicate continuous surveillance, route protection and rapid emergency response, particularly around isolated project sites. Intelligence gaps, information leakage and insider threats also remain concerns, as hostile actors may seek to identify Chinese personnel movements, project schedules, security arrangements and vulnerabilities.

At the same time, local grievances related to employment, land, resource distribution and political representation can be exploited by militant and insurgent groups for recruitment, propaganda and mobilization. Consequently, effective CPEC security requires not only enhanced physical protection and intelligence-led operations but also stronger community engagement, improved coordination among security agencies, robust personnel vetting, secure information management and timely response mechanisms to reduce both immediate security risks and the underlying factors that militant groups may exploit.

Impact on CPEC – The continuing attacks have implications extending well beyond individual security incidents. Every major attack involving Chinese nationals can result in project delays, increased insurance and security costs, disruption of construction schedules and greater scrutiny of future Chinese investments.

China’s concerns have become increasingly visible. Beijing expects Pakistan to provide effective protection for Chinese nationals and assets, and repeated attacks have raised questions regarding the effectiveness of existing security arrangements.

The issue is particularly sensitive because CPEC is not simply an economic programme; it is also a major component of the broader strategic relationship between Pakistan and China. Any prolonged deterioration in the security environment could therefore affect the pace of new investment, the implementation of existing projects and Chinese confidence in expanding its economic footprint in Pakistan.

Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Measures – Pakistan has continued to employ military, intelligence and law-enforcement measures against militant groups operating in KP and Baluchistan. The government has also introduced broader counterterrorism initiatives aimed at addressing the resurgence of militancy.

However, the scale and diversity of the threat present a significant challenge. Security forces are required to simultaneously address TTP-related militancy in KP, Baloch insurgency in Balochistan, attacks against security forces, cross-border militant activity and threats to strategic infrastructure.

This creates considerable pressure on available manpower, intelligence resources and operational capacity.

Conclusion – CPEC has been significantly affected by the deteriorating security environment in KP and Baluchistan. Repeated attacks on Chinese nationals, CPEC routes and strategic installations have disrupted projects, increased security requirements and generated growing Chinese concern regarding gaps in Pakistan’s security arrangements.

Pakistan has made substantial efforts to address these vulnerabilities. Since the early 2020s, and particularly following the security deterioration after August 2021, security arrangements for Chinese nationals in KP have been considerably strengthened. Dedicated security formations, enhanced intelligence operations, route protection, specialized training, improved coordination and even Chinese-language training for police personnel demonstrate the seriousness with which the government and security agencies view the issue.

Nevertheless, the persistence of attacks indicates that security remains the principal vulnerability to the sustainability and expansion of CPEC. The March 2024 Bisham attack was a particularly important warning, demonstrating that even heavily protected Chinese project personnel remain vulnerable during road movements.

The challenge therefore requires a multi layered security approach combining intelligence-led counterterrorism operations, effective route and site protection, modern surveillance and counter drone capabilities, improved inter-agency coordination, stronger vetting and protection of sensitive information, and greater engagement with local communities.

At the strategic level, Pakistan must ensure that security arrangements are not merely reactive after an attack but are based on continuous threat assessment and preventive intelligence. At the same time, addressing legitimate socioeconomic grievances in CPEC-affected areas can reduce the space available to militant organizations for recruitment and propaganda.

Ultimately, the future of CPEC will depend not only on financial investment and infrastructure development but also on Pakistan’s ability to provide a predictable, sustainable and credible security environment for Chinese personnel and assets.

The continued targeting of Chinese nationals risks increasing the cost of CPEC, delaying projects and weakening investor confidence. More importantly, persistent security failures could create friction in an otherwise strategically important Pakistan-China relationship. Therefore, safeguarding CPEC should be treated not merely as a provincial law-and-order responsibility, but as a national strategic priority involving security, diplomacy, economic policy and local governance.

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